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Abstract 
This article focuses on the special criminal procedures for the use of 
intelligence in terrorist trials in Canada, France, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. Since 9/11 and the terror attacks in 
London and Madrid, gathering intelligence as well as the 
prosecution of suspects of terrorist crimes have become strategic 
tools in countering terrorism. By reviewing the special procedures 
for the use of intelligence, their compatibility with human rights 
standards, including the right to fair trial, is discussed. Concerns 
include the extent to which disclosure is made possible and to 
whom. The differences in criminal procedures for the use of 
intelligence in terrorist trials also raises questions if intelligence 
origins from a third state, in which different regulations with regard 
to disclosure of information apply. 
Introduction 
In countering terrorism, both gathering intelligence as well as the prosecution 
of suspects of terrorist crimes are vital tools. Last year’s discovery of terror 
plots in the United States of America1, Yemen2 and Belgium3 underlines that 
information-sharing between security and intelligence services and law 
enforcement agencies is of the utmost strategic importance, not only because it 
ensures the protection of democratic societies against threats to national 
security, including terror attacks, but also because the prosecution of suspects 
of terrorist crimes delegitimizes their cause. Criminal trials have performative 
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 On November 26, 2010, a Somali teenager was arrested after undercover operations by the 
FBI discovered that the young man was plotting to bomb a Christmas tree-lighting ceremony in 
Portland.  See: ‘Feds Arrest Somali Teen in Oregon Bomb Plot’, CBS News, 27 November 2010. 
Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/27/national/main7093701.shtml. 
2
 On October 29, 2010, two packages of plastic explosives and a detonating device were found 
on two cargo aircraft after close operations between the intelligence agencies of the U.S., the 
U.K. and Yemen. See The Guardian (2010). 
3
 On November 23, 2010, three Moroccan-Dutch terrorist suspects were arrested in 
Amsterdam. In Belgium, Germany and Austria another seven suspects were taken into custody. 
These arrests were made after close collaboration between intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement authorities in the aforementioned countries.  BBC News (2010), ‘Police arrest 10 
over Belgian 'Islamist terror plot’’, BBC News, 23 November 2010. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11820008. 
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power4 in the sense that the state, through the public prosecutor, sends a 
message that the threat of terrorism is being dealt with, while concurrently 
human rights, such as the right to a fair trial, are respected. Furthermore, as the 
right to a fair trial5 is the cornerstone of the rule of law and democratic society, 
it is crucial that – terror – suspects are presumed innocent and tried publicly 
within a reasonable time by independent and impartial judges or juries. The 
criminal prosecution of terrorist crimes is an important counter-terrorism 
measure. Yet, because terror cases are often triggered by intelligence or this 
type of information is part of the evidence, there are human rights concerns in 
relation to its admissibility in ordinary criminal proceedings.6 Traditionally, a 
distinction exists between collecting intelligence for national security purposes 
and gathering evidence for criminal investigations, as they serve different 
purposes. This distinction also translates into the allocation of powers to law 
enforcement officials and the specific powers allotted to the intelligence 
services. For the latter, it is crucial that the sources of the intelligence are kept 
secret, whereas the fair trial principle demands that during a criminal trial, the 
public prosecutor and defence counsel enjoy equal access to the evidence. 
However, in specific circumstances, such as the prosecution of terrorist crimes, 
these two worlds meet and intelligence information is shared. The 
circumstances as well as the requirements that apply to these particular cases 
should be clearly formulated in the law. In order to guarantee the right to a fair 
trial as laid down in several human rights treaties, checks and balances should 
be in place.7 A number of Western democracies have struggled with designing 
(special) procedures that allow for the use of intelligence information in 
criminal trials and henceforth fulfil the aforementioned criteria.  
In this article, we discuss some of the special procedures that allow the use of 
intelligence information in terrorist trials. We elaborate on the key question 
concerning the usage of intelligence in criminal cases: Is the use of intelligence 
information in terrorist trials compatible with human rights both in theory and 
in practice? We focus on four case studies, namely the special procedures in 
the Netherlands, Canada, France and the United Kingdom.  
I. Two Worlds Apart? Intelligence Gathering and Criminal Investigation 
Intelligence services and law enforcement agencies both need information to 
prepare their case files.8 However, their files serve very distinct purposes. Law 
                                                 
4
 Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (2010/2011), 
‘Nucleus: Terrorists on Trial. The Court Room as a Stage in the Struggle for Publicity, Public 
Support and Legitimacy’. Available at: 
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5
 European Convention on Human Rights, article 6.  
6
 N. Schrijver & L. van den Herik, ‘Counter-terrorism strategies, human rights and international 
law: meeting the challenges’, Final Report Poelgeest Seminar 2010. The Hague: Grotius Centre 
for International legal Studies. 
7
 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 14. 
8
 For more information see: J.E.B. Coster van Voorhout, ‘Intelligence as Legal Evidence, 
Comparative criminal research into the viability of the proposed Dutch scheme of shielded 
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enforcement agencies, as well as the public prosecutor, carry out investigations 
in order to gather evidence to build a criminal case. In order to convict a 
suspect, criminal accountability needs to be established. Simultaneously, there 
is the presumption of innocence until proven guilty according to the law.9 
Ultimately, they need to be able to present evidence before the court where, 
because of the fair trial principle, all sources should be known to both parties. 
The powers granted to the authorities in criminal investigations are laid down 
in procedural laws. These powers include, but are not limited to, the hearing of 
witness testimony, interrogation powers as well as collecting evidence 
(personal, digital, forensic, phone-tapping, etc.). The manner in which pre-trial 
detention and criminal investigations are conducted should be in conformity 
with international human rights standards, in particular the right to a fair trial.  
On the other hand, the focus of the intelligence services is predominantly 
directed towards gathering information on, and analysing aspects of, possible 
threats to national security. This involves a lack of transparency, as a substantial 
part of the activities of intelligence and security services concerns covert 
operations and the intelligence sources are protected. Powers, although 
extensive, are not unlimited, and are clearly and exhaustively defined in 
national laws. These powers may include the gathering of privacy-sensitive 
information and sometimes profiling, detention and interrogation.  
II. The Use of Intelligence Information in Criminal Court Cases 
In exceptional circumstances, intelligence is forwarded to and acted upon by 
law enforcement agencies; it may for instance trigger a criminal investigation or 
be used as ‘secret’ evidence in court.10 The former occurs when gathered 
intelligence is used to tip-off the police to initiate an investigation. For example, 
in the foiled terrorist plot in the abovementioned Belgian case, intelligence 
services had informed the police about a suspected threat. However, the 
information that is initially shared is often limited and generally not used as 
evidence in the criminal case. The information shared will be examined by law 
enforcement agencies in order to establish whether it is sufficient to give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion, in which case it will trigger a criminal investigation 
during which the information may be used as evidence in the indictment.  
The use of intelligence as ‘secret’ evidence in criminal investigations is relevant 
for the prosecution of terrorism suspects. Intelligence as legal evidence in 
general implies that sources and modus operandi are kept secret for state 
security purposes. In order to use intelligence in criminal court cases, witnesses 
                                                                                                                                   
intelligence witnesses in England and Wales, and legislative compliance with Article 6(3) ECHR’, 
Utrecht Law Review 2005-2, No. 2, pp. 119-144; J. Vervaele, ‘Terrorism and Information Sharing 
Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities in the US and the Netherlands: 
emergency criminal law?’, Utrecht Law Review 2005- 1, No.1, pp. 1-27. 
9
 European Convention on Human Rights, article 6. 
10
 D. van der Bel, A.M. Van Hoorn & J. J. T. M. Pieters, Informatie en Opsporing. Handboek 
informatieverwerking, -verwerking en –verstrekking ten behoeve van de opsporingspraktijk, 
Zeist: Uitgeverij Kerckebosch 2009. 
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tend to be heard anonymously. In absolute terms, this is incompatible with the 
fundamental right to a fair trial, which holds that “everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing” and “equality of arms” and further requires that the 
hearing needs to be conducted by a “competent, independent and impartial” 
judge or jury.11  
The Eminent Jurists Panel, in its report on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights, concludes that the use of intelligence “by its very nature, poses 
particular problems for the principle of fair trial”. This is particularly the case 
since “some states have amended the regulations governing legal or 
administrative procedures to broaden the permissible grounds for non-
disclosure of materials to suspects; and suspects are given limited opportunities 
to test the veracity of the information upon which their arrest, detention, or 
subsequent charges rest.”12 
In criminal trials, information may, subject to particular criteria, be legitimately 
withheld in order to protect national security. However, tensions could arise 
because of the effect on the right to fair trial. This may be resolved with the 
practical guidance of international law. This was apparent in the case Wassink 
v. the Netherlands, during which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
ruled that information may be withheld in criminal procedures if particular 
conditions are met.13 
III. The International Legal Framework 
Following the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it is possible to limit 
particular human rights in the interest of national security and public order. 
These include the right to freedom of expression and assembly and association. 
However, such exceptions do not entail derogation of the right to a fair trial. 
Thus, when intelligence is being used in criminal trials such as the Dutch 
Piranha case,14 questions emerge concerning fundamental rights. Safeguards 
against arbitrary or unlawful government conduct are the right to a fair trial, 
equality of arms before the courts, and the right to privacy. These minimum 
standards are enshrined in several human rights treaties and ensure that 
procedural requirements are met. The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee concluded in its General Comment that even in emergency 
                                                 
11
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14. 
12
 The Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, Assessing 
Damage, Urging Action, Geneva: International Commission of Jurists 2009. 
13
 European Court on Human Rights 27 september 1990, A/185-A) p. 11(Wassink v. 
Netherlands). 
14
 Judgement No.: AZ3589, District Court of Rotterdam, 10/600052-05, 10/600108-05, 
10/600134-05, 10/600109-05, 10/600122-05, 10/600023-06, 10/600100-06, 1 December 2006/ 
Judgement No: BF3987, Court of Appeal of The Hague, no. 2200734906, 2 October 2008/ 
Judgement No: BF5225, Court of Appeal of The Hague, no. 2200735006, 2 October 2008/ 
Judgement No.: BF4814, Court of Appeal of The Hague, no. 2200735106, 2 October 2008/ 
Judgement No.: BF5180, Court of Appeal of The Hague, no.2200738406, 2 October 2008. 
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situations one cannot diverge from fair trial standards.15 The - potential - 
competing values of security versus human rights need to be balanced by 
independent safeguards. 
The principle of fair trial is laid down in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 8 of the ECHR and in Articles 47 and 48 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU). The ICCPR 
addresses the requirements of fair trial in Article 14. These include the right of 
an individual to be informed of the measures taken; to know the case against 
him or her; the right to be heard within a reasonable amount of time; the right 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent and independent review 
mechanism; the right to counsel with respect to all proceedings; and the right 
to have his or her conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal 
according to the law.16 Furthermore, the EU Charter under Articles 7 and 8 
recognises the right to privacy and data protection and the ICCPR prohibits 
member states from violating privacy violations under Article 17. It also 
requires the protection of persons by law against arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence.17 If a person is 
under surveillance or personal data is collected, this needs to be authorised by 
law. The legislation concerning the limitation of privacy must be just, 
predictable and reasonable and needs a precise description of the 
circumstances in which the interference is permitted.18  
The Council of Europe has established guidelines with regard to human rights 
and the fight against terrorism. According to these guidelines, personal data 
may be collected and processed by any competent authority in the field of state 
security, even though it might interfere with the right to private life.19 The 
Council also demands that measures that are used in the fight against terrorism 
that interfere with privacy, such as body searches, bugging, telephone tapping, 
the surveillance of personal correspondence and the use of undercover agents, 
must be provided for by law. Furthermore, it must be possible to challenge the 
lawfulness of these measures before a court.  
 
IV. Introducing Four Case Studies 
A number of Western states have implemented special procedures to use 
intelligence information in criminal trials related to terrorism. These are 
presumed to be compatible with human rights both in law and in practice. The 
special procedures introduced in the Netherlands, Canada, France and the 
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 Human Rights Committee. 
16
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008), ‘Human Rights, 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism’, Fact sheet No. 32. Geneva: OHCHR. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Human Rights Committee (1978), ‘Views on Communication’, Mauritian women v. Mauritius 
No. 35/1978 9 April 1981. 
19
 Governed by appropriate provisions of domestic law; proportional; subject to supervision by 
an external independent authority. 
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United Kingdom serve as case studies in this section. Furthermore, the 
discussion focuses both on their effectiveness and whether they indeed 
guarantee the right to a fair trial. 
IV.1 The Netherlands 
Traditionally, there is a strict separation between the intelligence and security 
services and the public prosecutor’s office, who each work under their own 
legal regime. One important feature is the obligation on the intelligence and 
security services to protect their sources, working methods and current 
knowledge. During trial, on the other hand, it is the task of the public 
prosecutor and the judge to protect the elementary guarantees of a criminal 
procedure, namely to review the accuracy of information serving as evidence. 
Despite the watertight separation between the tasks, powers and 
responsibilities of the organisations which are involved in countering terrorism, 
within the statutory framework it is possible to have –if necessary and 
expedient– an intensive information flow between them. Information that is 
relevant for the investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes can at the 
discretion of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) be 
provided to the Netherlands Public Prosecutor Service via an official written 
report (Ambtsbericht). The National Public Prosecutor on Counter-Terrorism 
analyses all the relevant information, which can be used to initiate an 
investigation or as evidence in court. This is an obligation for the public 
prosecutor, who is responsible for the particular case. According to the 
interpretation of the Dutch Supreme Court and a ruling of the European Court 
of Human Rights,20 the commencement of a criminal investigation must be 
based on a reasonable suspicion of guilt of a particular criminal offence or, in 
case of terrorism, an indication.  
In order to use the information that is collected by the intelligence and security 
services21 as evidence in criminal trials, the Dutch legislature initiated the 'Act 
on Shielded Witnesses'22 (Wet Afgeschermde Getuigen; also translated as the 
Witness Identity Protection Act) in September 2006. This procedure, ex parte 
and in camera, was implemented to provide for the hearing of a shielded 
witness in case disclosure of the identity of the witness could endanger the 
witness or national security. The Act implements substantive reforms. 
Intelligence information may now be admitted in an official written  AIVD-
                                                 
20
 Human Rights Committee (2001), General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. 
21
 The primary intelligence and security services in the Netherlands are the General Intelligence 
and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst: AIVD), the Military Intelligence 
and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst: MIVD), and the Regional 
Intelligence Services of the police force (RID). The powers of the intelligence and security 
services are geared towards gathering information relating to national security. They provide 
information about possible threats and risks relating to state security to other bodies such as 
the police, which in turn take security measures. 
22
 Act of 28 September 2006 (Stb. 2006, 460). Important changes in the Code of criminal 
procedure: Article 136d C.C.r.P; Article 226m C.C.r.P. 
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report23 and examined through the hearing of witnesses by a ‘special’ 
examining magistrate (Rechter-Commissaris). Subsequently, the last hindrance 
to use intelligence information in criminal trials was dissolved.24  
The examining magistrate has the power to decide whether, in the interest of 
national security, particular information must remain secret and whether the 
witness should be shielded. This is done in the pre-trial phase by a special 
section of the Rotterdam District Court. If possible, whilst attempting to assess 
the value of the intelligence, the trial participants may be present, while the 
witness is shielded (in camera, but not ex parte). However, the most common 
procedure is to hand in a list of questions for the witness to the special 
examining magistrate. This can be done by counsel representing the suspect 
and the trial judge, for whom the hearing is shielded. The report of the hearing 
will only be submitted to the parties with the consent of the shielded witness.25 
Important to note is that Article 344a Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates 
that someone can never be convicted solely on evidence adduced by 
anonymous sources. This is a crucial concern in relation to the Act: AIVD 
officers will hardly ever be able to produce any extra information that supports 
the official written report that is submitted as evidence. So far, the Act on 
Shielded Witness has not been used in the Netherlands.26 With regard to 
verifiable information, such as reports from phone- and email-taps, recordings 
of confidential communications by means of technical equipment, and video-
tapes of surveillance, there are fewer concerns to submit this information as 
evidence in terrorist trials. 
The AIVD’s power is checked and balanced by internal rules, guidelines and 
procedures and is under the direct scrutiny of the House of Representatives. 
There are also several external bodies that provide oversight, namely the 
Intelligence and Security Services Supervisory Committee (Commissie van 
Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: CTIVD), the 
Netherlands Court of Audit and the National Ombudsman. 
One can discern a number of human rights concerns in relation to the Dutch 
procedure to use intelligence information in criminal trials related to 
terrorism.27 The trial judge is hardly able to assess the reliability of the official 
                                                 
23
 An official written report contains testimonies by officials and informants. 
24
 M.A.H. van der Woude, Wetgeving in een Veiligheidscultuur. Totstandkoming van 
antiterrorismewetgeving in Nederland bezien vanuit maatschappelijke en (rechts)politieke 
context, The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2010. 
25
 J.A.E. Vervaele, ‘Terrorism and Information Sharing Between Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement Communities in the US and the Netherlands: emergency criminal law?’. Utrecht 
Law Review 2005-1, No.1, pp. 1-27. 
26
 M.A.H. van der Woude (2010), ‘Wetgeving in een Veiligheidscultuur. Totstandkoming van 
antiterrorismewetgeving in Nederland bezien vanuit maatschappelijke en (rechts)politieke 
context, The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2010. 
27
 M. Alink, Q. Eijkman & K. Freeke, ‘AIVD-informatie als bewijs in het strafproces. Een 
Straatsburgs perspectief’, in: P.D. Duyx & P.D.J. van Zeben (eds.), Via Straatsburg (Myjer-
bundel), Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2004, pp. 155-79; Council of Europe, ‘Report by the 
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written reports. Both the judge and the defence counsel need to rely 
completely on the special examining magistrate. Furthermore, secret 
information may not have been collected by Dutch intelligence and security 
services themselves, but by foreign intelligence and security services 
(international information sharing). In any case, the application of the Act limits 
the right to a fair trial. The defence council does not have the opportunity to 
know who collected the evidence and also lacks the possibility to question the 
witness (even if this was the case, they may never relate to the identity of the 
witness). Subsequently, some statements are off-limits. For example, questions 
concerning where the witness was at a certain time cannot be put forward. 
Henceforth, a situation could occur in which the accused cannot prove his 
innocence with an alibi or in any other way discuss the competence of the 
witness. Additionally, the intelligence official who was questioned as a witness 
has a decisive say in whether or not the report of the examining magistrate will 
become part of the case file. 
IV.2 Canada 
In Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) are accountable to 
both the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and the Inspector 
General. The latter is an internal body that reports to the Canadian Minister of 
Public Safety, whereas the former, an external body, does so directly to 
Parliament. (Non-)Disclosure of secret information falls under the Canada 
Evidence Act (CEA) and applies to all cases in which sensitive information is 
used.28 This act sets out the pre-trial, trial and appellate procedures to be 
applied where there is a possibility that disclosing information will damage 
international relations, national defence or national security. Any participant or 
official who is aware of the – soon to be – disclosed sensitive information has to 
inform the Attorney General for Canada. The Attorney General or the Federal 
Court can determine whether the information can be disclosed. If the judge 
determines that one of these situations might occur upon disclosure, the judge 
will balance the competing public interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. 
Upon disclosure, the judge has the option to place particular conditions. 
An important feature in the Canadian counter-terrorism framework is 
Immigration Law (CIL). Any Canadian suspected of terrorist crimes is charged 
and the evidence is disclosed during trial. However, when a suspect is not a 
Canadian citizen, and if security risks relate to this particular person, a removal 
request will be issued in the form of a security certificate. According to the CIL, 
security certificates under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 
are issued by the Minister of Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety and 
reviewed by the Federal Court of Canada. The request is made after the 
government balances the risk to the suspect against the risk that the subject 
poses to Canada’s national security. The Federal Court has to contemplate the 
                                                                                                                                   
Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammerberg, on his visit to the Netherlands, 
CommDH (2009) 2’, 11 March 2009. 
28
 The Canada Evidence Act, Section 38. 
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public interest in disclosure against non-disclosure. Furthermore, the appellant 
only receives a summary of the secret information produced by the 
government, which limits the defendant’s ability to contest the evidence. 
The Supreme Court concluded in the case of Charkaoui v. Canada29 that a mere 
summary of the secret information is incompatible with the right to a fair trial. 
This is because the defendant is not fully aware of the case against him or her. 
In order to meet fair trial standards the Supreme Court proposed an 
alternative: a special advocate system, which is also used in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Subsequently, the special advocate model was 
implemented by the Canadian legislature under Bill C-3. Special advocates are 
counsel appointed by the Court to protect the interests of defendant, who is 
subject to a security certificate and, simultaneously, to ensure the 
confidentiality of the information, which could harm national security or 
endanger the safety of a person when disclosed.30 They have security clearance 
to access information that may harm national security or endanger a person’s 
safety, but operate independently from the government. Every person that is 
subject to a security certificate will have access to a special advocate. There are 
now 23 specially trained, security cleared special advocates appointed by the 
Minister of Justice under immigration and refugee protection law, from all 
regions of Canada. The special advocate has the ability to communicate with 
the person whose name is mentioned on the security certificate. Based on a 
summary, he or she will discuss the matter with the subject, in order to prepare 
for the closed court proceedings. It is up to the judge to decide whether the 
special advocate may communicate with the subject after reviewing the 
information. Special advocates will not be in a counsel-client relationship with 
the individual named in the certificate.31 Difficulties are that once the secret 
information is seen, the special advocate cannot communicate with other 
special advocates or counsel for the named person unless authorised by the 
judge. Special advocates could however play a role in negotiating with the 
government and formulating agreed statements of fact. Special advocates 
could also negotiate the release of some information or agree that the claim of 
secrecy is warranted. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of human rights concerns with the current 
system in Canada.32 After receiving a security certificate, a subject may be 
detained indefinitely, without charge. The evidence remains secret, which 
means that the defendant does not have the opportunity to know who 
collected the evidence against him or her. Therefore, the fair trial principle that 
                                                 
29
 Supreme Court of Canada, Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007 SCC 9, 1 S.C.R. 350. 
30
 C. Forcese & L. Waldman, ‘Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process. Lessons from Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of ‘Special Advocates’ in National Security 
Proceedings’, Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies 2007. 
31
 Canadian Department of Justice, ‘Backgrounder Bill C-3 and Special Advocates’ 2008. At: 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2007/doc_32198.html 
31
 Institute for Research on Public Policy, ‘Protecting Security and Human Rights: The Case of 
Migration in Canada’, Ottawa 2007. 
32
 Institute for Research on Public Policy (2007). 
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requires that sources are known to both parties is limited. Furthermore, with 
this procedure it is very well possible for immigrants to be deported to 
countries where they would be at risk of torture. Currently, three high-profile 
cases are being dealt with concerning the deportation of immigrants who are 
considered to pose an extreme risk to Canadian national security.33 These cases 
are being dealt with by special advocates.  
IV.3 France 
Compared to the Netherlands and Canada, the counter-terrorism laws in 
France did not dramatically change after 9/11. French legislation had already 
developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Subsequently, only modest 
legal reform, partly based on European counter-terrorism measures, was 
implemented.34 Also, the emphasis on combating Jihadi terrorism and 
international cooperation increased.35 French intelligence and secrete 
services36 mainly fall under the executive branch. Judicial investigations into 
criminal offences are initiated by the public prosecutor office. At its own 
discretion, the public prosecutor asks an investigating judge (juge d’instruction) 
to direct the investigation. This judge will first examine the state's case against 
the defendant and then decides to order a release without charge or a formal 
investigation (mettre en examen). In order to assist the investigating judge with 
the investigation, -judicial- police officers are assigned. During this pre-trial 
criminal investigation, the investigating judge seeks to uncover, with the help of 
special investigative techniques, both incriminating and exculpatory evidence. 
These include wiretaps, warrants and orders to appear as a witness. After this 
pre-trial criminal investigation, the investigating judge may recommend that 
the suspect be taken into pre-trial detention (detention provisoire). After this 
recommendation to the so-called liberty and custody judge (juge des libertés et 
de la detention), the prosecutor could decide to represent the state's interest 
before the liberty and custody judge, who is independent from the 
investigating judge.37  
The French procedure in the investigation phase is written and secret but only 
with respect to the general public and the media. It is fully adversarial at the 
early stages of the proceedings. Once the formal investigation has been 
notified, the suspect has full access to the case file through his or her counsel. A 
                                                 
33
Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 628, 
[2007] 1 F.C.R. 321 Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), 2005 FC 1645, 
[2006] 2 F.C.R. D-14, Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2007 FCA 80, [2007] 3 F.C.R. D8. 
34
 ‘Law on the Fights Against Terrorism and on Various Dispositions Concerning Security and 
Border Control’ (Loi 2006-64). 
35
 Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law (2008), ‘Case Study: France. Citizens and 
Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society’, The Hague 
36
 The primary French intelligence agencies are the Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence 
(Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur, DCRI) and the General Directorate for External 
Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, DSGE). 
37
 Human Rights Watch (2008), Preempting Justice: Counterterrorism Laws and Procedures in 
France, Ney York: Human Rights Watch report, pp. 7-8. 
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copy of the case file is delivered to the counsel on the first appearance of the 
suspect. All the evidence has to be submitted and discussed before court during 
the trial. The investigating magistrate does not have a security clearance; he or 
she is thus not authorised to have direct access to classified information. 
Moreover, unauthorised access to classified information is constitutive of a 
criminal offence. The access of the investigating judge to classified documents 
is controlled by an independent authority (Consultative Commission for 
National Defence Secrets). The judge may refer to this Commission with a 
request for a partial or complete declassification of documents. Once a specific 
document is declassified, either totally or partially, it is transmitted to the 
investigating judge and added to the case file. From that stage onward, the 
information is protected only by the confidentiality of the investigation, but is 
known to the defendant and his counsel and could be released publicly during 
the trial. In case of a violation of the right to a fair trial, as well as respect for 
human dignity or for physical and mental integrity and the right to privacy, the 
evidence can be dismissed during either the investigation or the trial phase. 
The investigating judge is given significant authority in terrorism cases. This is 
based on the notion that all possible evidence on terrorist networks and their 
crimes will lead to the closure of the case.38 Consequently, the intelligence and 
security services and investigating judges have a close relationship and almost 
all terrorism-related court cases have used information gathered by the 
intelligence and security services. Investigating judges can deny requests for 
investigative steps in the course of a judicial investigation. For example, in the 
case of Christian Ganczarski,39 only the request for an inquiry commission into 
Saudi Arabia was accepted. The other twenty-three requests were denied by 
the investigating judge on the grounds that there was a risk that the 
information would be used to pressure others involved. These decisions can in 
general be appealed by the counsel in the court of appeal. 
Human rights concerns include that there is only a small group of judges and 
public prosecutors who are fully aware of the types of techniques, information 
and assessments that are used. This interconnectedness between the secret 
and intelligence services and the investigating judges may lead to their 
independence being compromised.40 The defence counsel does not have the 
right to cross-examine protected witnesses and agents from the secret and 
intelligence services with protected identities. The latter are not obliged to 
reveal their sources. However, information based on non-identified sources has 
no value, unless it is corroborated by the investigation and if the manner in 
which the intelligence was initially obtained does not breach international 
human rights law such as the ECHR. 
                                                 
38
 Idem 36, p. 10. 
39
 European Commission for Democracy through Law/Venice Commission (2007), ‘Report on 
the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services’, CDL-AD(2007)016, Strasbourg, 11 June 
2007, par. 213. 
40
 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission 2007), paragraph 
213. 
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IV.4 The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a pioneer with regard to counter-terrorism 
legislation. The legislative response, among others the Terrorist Act 2000, had 
been initiated because of the terrorist crimes of the Irish Republican Army, Sinn 
Fein and the Ulster Freedom Fighters41. They concern a substantial number of 
prohibitions of terrorism and terrorist-related crimes.42 As in the Canadian case, 
the UK implemented a system of special advocates in order to use intelligence 
information in criminal trials.  
The UK, like Canada and several other Western democracies such as the 
Netherlands, also relies on immigration law as a means to detain potential 
terrorists.43 The procedure governing the special advocates was implemented 
in 1996, following the conclusion of the ECtHR in Chahal v. UK.44 The UK system 
prior to 1996 consisted of a personal executive decision of the Home Secretary 
to deport an individual on national security grounds. This decision was then 
reviewed by a panel that made recommendations on whether the removal 
order should stand.45 The ECtHR concluded that the UK system was in violation 
of the ECHR, since the information was kept secret and it denied all means for 
lawyers of the appellant to challenge the secret information on which the 
decision was based. The decision of the ECtHR resulted in the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission Act of 1997. With regard to the 
implementation of this Act, a Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
was created, as well as a superior court of record sitting in panels comprising a 
High Court judge, an immigration adjudicator and a lay member with security 
and intelligence expertise.46 Since the appellant and lawyers are excluded from 
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, the SIAC Act authorises the 
appointment of a special advocate, as a representative of the interests of the 
appellant. When information is withheld from the appellant on national 
security grounds, the special advocate is appointed by the UK Attorney General. 
The special advocate may not communicate with the appellant once he or she 
has received the secret information. 
Special advocates are employed in all proceedings that implicate national 
security concerns. These include the listing of banned terrorist organisations 
                                                 
41
 G. Bennet, ´Legislative Responses to Terrorism: A View from Britain´, The Penn State Law 
Review 2005-109 No. 4, pp. 947-966. 
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 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.). 
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 K. Roach,  Must we trade rights for security? The choice between smart, harsh or 
proportionate security strategies in Canada and Britain, Toronto: University of Toronto 2006. 
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 European Court of Human Rights, Chahal v. The United Kingdom,  70/1995; 22414/93; (1996) 
23 EHRR 413; [1996] ECHR 54. 
45
 C. Forcese & L. Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process. Lessons from Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of ‘Special Advocates’ in National Security 
Proceedings,Ottowa: Study commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security 
Studies,2007, p. 20. 
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 Ibid. 
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under the Terrorism Act 2000,47 the exclusion of individuals from accessing 
dangerous substances under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,48 
the denying of security clearance to individuals,49 criminal cases, planning 
inquiries, race relations and parole proceedings.50  
The use of secret evidence in UK courts has increasingly grown during the past 
decade and this causes several human rights concerns. The Joint Committee on 
Human Rights concluded in their sixteenth report on Counter-Terrorism Policy 
and Human Rights that the UK’s use of secret evidence and special advocates 
needs an “urgent and comprehensive review …. in all contexts in which they are 
used”.51 Since special advocates are not allowed to communicate with the 
appellant after having received the classified information – with the exception 
of a very limited number of cases52 – evidence will remain unclear for the 
appellant. This is incompatible with both Common Law and Article 6 ECHR that 
guarantees the right to a fair hearing.53   
Conclusion 
By using intelligence information in terrorist trials, there is a risk that human 
rights, principally the right to a fair trial, are breached. This is because of the 
limited opportunity for terror suspects to review and question the evidence 
upon which their arrest, detention or subsequent charges are based. 
Subsequently, questions arise whether not only the use of intelligence 
information in terrorist trials is compatible with human rights, but also if they 
constitute accountable counter-terrorism measures. The Eminent Jurist Panel, 
for instance, concluded that states should take steps to ensure that the work of 
security and intelligence services is fully compliant with human rights law, that 
the powers of security, intelligence and law enforcement services should be 
separate and the limitations to the disclosure of information in criminal trials 
should be lawful, necessary and proportionate as well as applied non-
discriminatory.54  
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The special criminal procedures for the use of intelligence in terrorist trials in 
Canada, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom all meet some of the 
aforementioned human rights criteria. They are all lawful and to some extent 
necessary to counter real terrorist threats. Yet, their proportionality and non-
discriminatory application could be questioned by the defence counsel and the 
public at large. Furthermore, even though the four procedures have similarities 
they show substantive differences in the way intelligence information is 
submitted during trial, and the extent to which disclosure is made possible, and 
to whom. These differences raise distinct concerns in relation to checks and 
balances. For example, when intelligence information originates from a third 
state, is it submitted and to whom? In theory in the Canadian and the English 
legal systems the special advocates and in the French and Dutch legal system 
the examining magistrate counter-balance the limitations to the right to full 
disclosure of intelligence information, but in practise the fairness of terrorist 
trials and the sense of justice might be compromised. Henceforth the right to a 
fair trial is under threat when intelligence information is used in terrorist trials. 
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